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Gifts of the Heart . . . and Other Tissues: Legalizing
the Sale of Human Organs and Tissues
“We buy and sell body parts all the time; we just don’t call it that.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a scenario in which a young individual tragically dies,
but in a way that preserves almost all of her internal organs.2 Further,
imagine that after she is declared brain dead at the hospital, her
family decides to donate her organs.3 Despite this magnanimous
decision which will save others’ lives, the family must bear all
expenses for the funeral and other final expenses4 because, under
current law, the family is prohibited from receiving anything in
compensation for the donation.5 Yet, at the same time, thousands of
dollars are changing hands between doctors, hospitals, medical
transport companies, and insurance companies in completely legal
business transactions for these donated organs.6
This scenario is actually not imaginary at all, but is the
established system of organ and tissue transfer under current law.
Federal and state laws prohibit the receipt of consideration for an
organ donation.7 However, to say that organs are not being bought
and sold is to ignore reality.8 While most people are somewhat aware
of black market transactions in various human tissues—mostly
internal organs—fewer are aware that a massive and legitimate
industry has been built around the trade of human remains.9 The

1. Peter S. Young, Moving to Compensate Families in Human-Organ Market: Legal
Scholars and Doctors Lead Way, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1994, at B7 (quoting Fred H. Cate,
associate professor at Indiana University School of Law in Bloomington).
2. This scenario describes the tragic story of Susan Sutton. Id.
3. Id.
4. Susan’s family had to borrow money for the funeral, but was still unable to afford a
headstone and buried Susan in an unmarked grave. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2006); UNIF. ANATOMICAL
GIFT
ACT
§§
1–11
(1987)
(amended
2006),
available
at
http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Anatomical%20Gift%20Act%20%281987%29.
8. See Young, supra note 1.
9. See Renie Schapiro, Banking on the Gift of Tissue, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 2,
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same federal and state laws that prohibit donors from receiving
compensation for their organs and tissues facilitate this industry by
providing recovery of costs to anyone who removes, stores,
transports, processes, or transplants the organ or tissue.10
Understandably, these provisions are essential to facilitate organ
donations as doctors, hospitals, medical transportation companies,
and tissue banks need to earn money to operate. However, given
that the demand for organs11 and tissues12 is greater than the supply,
these same doctors, hospitals, and medical companies inflate the
costs of their “services” to capture the entire value of the organ.13
Despite the billions of dollars changing hands in transactions for
human tissues and organs,14 the donors themselves are prohibited
from receiving any compensation.15
This Comment argues that the donors, as the most rightful
owners of the value of their organs and tissues, have a right to
participate in this industry. The literature advocating the removal of
restrictions on human-organ and tissue sales has mostly done so on
the grounds that it is justified by the need to eliminate the organ
shortage.16 While this is a valid consideration, it sidesteps the ethical
objections to the sale of human organs and tissues by arguing that
the ends justify the means, and any ethical objections to organ sales
are outweighed by the practical need to save lives. In contrast, this
Comment attempts to focus more directly on the ethical dilemma by
considering the question whether an individual should have the right
to claim the value of his or her own body. Ultimately, this Comment
concludes that while strong societal interests justify the prohibition
of inter vivos sales, no such interests exist to prevent postmortem
transfers. Subsequently, the current law merely transfers wealth from
donors to doctors, hospitals, and medical companies and reduces
individual autonomy by eliminating the contractual power of donors
to control the future use of their organs. Thus, amending the law to
2005, at G1.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 274e.
11. Steve P. Calandrillo, Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America’s Organ
Shortage, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 83–86 (2004).
12. ANNIE CHENEY, BODY BROKERS: INSIDE AMERICA’S UNDERGROUND TRADE IN
HUMAN REMAINS 8 (2006).
13. See id.
14. See Schapiro, supra note 9.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 274e.
16. See, e.g., Calandrillo, supra note 11.
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allow postmortem organ sales would result in a more equitable legal
structure and likely save more lives.
Part II of this Comment outlines the current statutory and
jurisprudential frameworks surrounding the law’s treatment of organ
transplantation and the human body more generally. Part III briefly
discusses various proposals for organ and tissue sales and their
criticisms. Part IV discusses the societal interests supporting the
prohibition on organ and tissue sales. Part V analyzes these
arguments in light of the current legal structure and argues that an
individual should have the right to capture the market value of the
rights to her body upon her death since this would provide for a
more equitable distribution of wealth and would increase autonomy.
Finally, Part VI concludes that the law can easily be amended to
allow organ sales to achieve this more equitable result, while still
protecting society’s interests currently supporting the prohibition on
sales.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The sanctity of the human body is something that is deeply
embedded in cultures worldwide. Egyptians sought to preserve the
bodies of the pharaohs through mummification so that the body
could be used in the afterlife.17 The Bible describes God’s threat to
the children of Israel that if they would not keep His
commandments, animals would defile and devour their corpses.18
Ajax stood over the body of Patroclus to prevent Hector and the
Trojans from beheading him and defiling his body.19 Throughout
history and cultures, protecting the integrity of the dead has been an
abiding duty of the living.
Thus, for the greater part of history, the human corpse has been
a liability, obligating the living to ensure its proper handling. Recent
technology, however, has changed this. The human corpse is now a
valuable asset whose organs and tissues can heal the living, and
whose limbs and parts aid researchers in developing new techniques
and procedures to cure human illness and injury.20 This value will

17.
(2001).
18.
19.
20.

See generally JOHN H. TAYLOR, DEATH AND THE AFTERLIFE IN ANCIENT EGYPT
Deuteronomy 28:15, 26.
HOMER, THE ILIAD (Ian Johnston trans., 2d ed. 2006).
See infra notes 128–31 and accompanying text.
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only increase as developments in technology create more uses for
human tissues. However, the emergence of value in the human
cadaver, combined with the historical charge to protect the integrity
of the dead, has exposed weaknesses in the laws governing what can
and cannot be done with a deceased human body. Specifically, the
emergence of value has created an entire industry trading in dead
human tissues for health, research, and improvements in medical
technology.21 Yet, the law has failed to determine to whom the value
rightfully belongs and how far these cultural duties of protecting the
dead should extend.
A. Statutory Framework
In the United States, two statutes govern the transfer of human
tissue from one individual to another. The National Organ
Transplant Act (“NOTA”),22 passed in 1984, is the controlling
federal law. In addition, all states have passed some form of a model
act entitled the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (“UAGA”).23 As their
names suggest, NOTA deals only with organ donations,24 while
UAGA focuses on postmortem donations of a wider variety of
human tissues.25 Although there may be some flexibility in the plain
language, these statutes are generally thought to prohibit any sale of
almost all human tissues for any purpose.26
21. See infra Part V.A.
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 273–274g (2006).
23. Henry Hansmann, The Economics and Ethics of Markets for Human Organs, 14 J.
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 57, 58 (1989).
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 273–274g. “Organ” is defined very broadly, including any “kidney,
liver, heart, lung, pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone, and skin or any subpart thereof,”
id. § 274e(c)(1), as well as the “intestine, including the esophagus, stomach, small and/or
large intestine, or any portion of the gastrointestinal tract,” 42 C.F.R. § 121.13 (2010).
25. See REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT §§ 2(3), 3 (2006), [hereinafter
RUAGA] available at http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Anatomical%20Gift%20Act%20.
26. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, TEX. A&M HEALTH SCI. CTR.,
http://medicine.tamhsc.edu/willed-body/faq.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2012); Dep’t of
Neurobiology
and
Developmental
Sci.,
U.
OF
ARK.
FOR
MED.
SCI.,
http://www.uams.edu/neuroscience_cellbiology/anatomical_gift_program/ (last visited Jan.
17, 2012); University of Michigan Anatomical Donations Program, U. OF MICH. MED. SCH.,
http://www.med.umich.edu/anatomy/donors/faq.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2012);
University of Utah Body Donor Program: Questions and Answers, U. OF UTAH,
http://www.neuro.utah.edu/related_links/bodydonor/faq.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2012).
The flexibility is a result of UAGA’s definition of “anatomical gift” encompassing
transplantation, therapy, research, or education purposes, while the prohibition on sales only
specifically mentions transplantation or therapy purposes, thus creating some ambiguity
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Congress passed NOTA partly to encourage organ donation,27
and partly to make explicit what was only an inferred prohibition on
the sale of organs in the UAGA.28 Advancements in organ transplant
technology had dramatically increased the success rates of organ
transplant procedures, but as the demand for organs correspondingly
rose, donations of organs remained constant.29 At the same time, and
as a result of this supply and demand discrepancy, the first suggestion
for an open market for organs was made.30 Weighing these two
somewhat competing values—increasing donation on the one hand,
but prohibiting a market on the other—Congress settled on the
following language in NOTA: “It shall be unlawful for any person to
knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ
for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if the
transfer affects interstate commerce.”31 Thus, by focusing on the
receipt of consideration by donors, Congress explicitly banned organ
sales,32 while still providing for medical and economic structures that
facilitate the transfer of organs from one individual to another.33

regarding sales for research or educational purposes. RUAGA §§ 2(3), 16. One can, however,
receive compensation for blood, sperm, or ova. Calandrillo, supra note 11, at 97.
27. See S. REP. NO. 98-382, at 2 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3976.
The Senate report notes that of the 20,000 deaths occurring in ways suitable for organ
transplantation, only 15% of those resulted in a donation. Id.
28. Calandrillo, supra note 11, at 78–79. UAGA in its original form did not expressly
prohibit the sale of organs, but courts inferred a prohibition due to its exclusive use of the
word “gift.” Id. at 78.
29. Id. at 79.
30. Walter Sullivan, Buying of Kidneys of Poor Attacked: Foundation Call Plan to Lure
Transplant Donors Immoral and Unethical, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1983, at 9.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2006).
32. Id. However, the scope of this ban is eroding with the advent of new technology. In
Flynn v. Holder, No. 10-55643, 2011 WL 5986689 (9th Cir. Dec. 1, 2011), the Ninth Circuit
recently held that the application of NOTA, as applied to a specific type of bone marrow
transplant, violated the Equal Protection Clause. The case involved “peripheral blood stem cell
apheresis” whereby “hematopoietic stem cells” produced in the bone marrow are extracted for
donation through the donor’s blood. Id. at *1. The court reasoned that these cells were not a
“subpart” of bone marrow, which is a listed organ in NOTA, but a product of the bone
marrow resembling blood, sperm, or ova, all of which are outside of the compensation
prohibition of NOTA. Id. at *3, *7. Consequently, the court held that no rational basis existed
to prohibit the receipt of compensation for bone marrow donated through apheresis while
allowing compensation for blood, sperm, and ova, and the application of NOTA violated the
Equal Protection Clause. Id. at *3–*4.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a). Other parts of the law provide for programs encouraging and
facilitating donation. Most notably, NOTA created the Organ Procurement and
Transplantation Network (“OPTN”) to coordinate the nationwide effort of procurement and
transplantation. About OPTN: Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, History,

317

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1/26/2012 12:42 PM

2012

Although the UAGA came first, it was amended to align with
and accommodate NOTA’s organ transplant provisions, while still
regulating other anatomical gifts with which NOTA is not
concerned.34 In contrast to NOTA’s regulations of “any human
organ,”35 UAGA governs “anatomical gift[s],” defined as
“donation[s] of all or part of a human body to take effect after the
donor’s death for the purpose of transplantation, therapy, research,
or education.”36 This definition encompasses “tissue of a human
being,”37 where “tissue” is defined as “a portion of the human body
other than an organ or an eye” with the exception of blood.38
Consequently, in addition to incorporating NOTA’s prohibitions on
sales of human organs,39 UAGA also restricts the receipt of valuable
consideration for cadaveric donations, donations of bodies to
science, and tissue donations to research institutions, universities,
and hospitals.40 For the sake of simplicity, this Comment will refer
generally to “organ” as a term encompassing all human tissues
regulated under UAGA or NOTA.
Despite their prohibitions on sale, neither UAGA nor NOTA
proscribe economic markets for organs. Both NOTA and UAGA
contain exceptions for “reasonable payments associated with the
removal, transportation, implantation, processing, preservation,
quality control, and storage of a human organ or the expenses of
travel, housing, and lost wages incurred by the donor of a human
organ in connection with the donation of the organ.”41 These

HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVICES ADMIN., http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/optn/history.asp
(last visited Jan. 17, 2012). The most recognizable task of OPTN is to maintain the lists of
organ donors and organ recipients to facilitate the finding of biologically suitable matches. See
About OPTN: Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, Profile, HEALTH RESOURCES
& SERVICES ADMIN., http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/optn/profile.asp (last visited Jan. 17,
2012).
34. Calandrillo, supra note 11, at 78–79; RUAGA §§ 1–23 (2006).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a).
36. RUAGA § 2(3).
37. RUAGA § 2(18).
38. RUAGA § 2(30).
39. RUAGA § 16.
40. See supra note 26.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2) (2006). The UAGA’s language is similar: “A person may
charge a reasonable amount for the removal, processing, preservation, quality control, storage,
transportation, implantation, or disposal of a part.” RUAGA § 16(b). NOTA also contains an
exception for compensation of donors’ “travel, housing, and lost wages.” 42 U.S.C. §
274e(c)(2).
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exceptions allow doctors, hospitals, and tissue banks to collect
compensation for the services they provide. In other words, after an
organ is donated, the medical team involved in its removal, the
hospital where the donation took place, any medical transportation
company involved in transporting the organ, and any tissue bank
involved in processing the organ can each attach the cost of their
services to the organ and collect either from the organ recipient or,
more likely, the organ recipient’s insurance company.42 Therefore,
even though the initial sale of an organ is prohibited, the path from
donor to recipient comprises a series of transactions in which money
changes hands.
B. The Legal Status of Human Body Parts
The jurisprudence underpinning the legal status of human body
parts is, at best, confused. This, in part, is due to the various legal
theories that interact when discussing the transfer of human organs.
The common law tradition that has protected some interests in body
parts is now inadequate since the value in a dead body has only
recently been—and is continually being—established by modern
technology. Additionally, statutes concerned with tissue transfer have
sought to preserve a distinction between the body and property, but
with unintended consequences. Finally, this debate implicates recent
doctrines of the constitutional right of privacy, adding yet another
wrinkle to the legal framework.
Traditionally, common law recognized no property rights in a
corpse,43 and technology did not exist to preserve any viable use of
an organ outside a living body. Courts did recognize some limited
quasi-property rights held by the next of kin, allowing family
members to oversee the proper burial of the deceased.44 Additionally,

42. See Young, supra note 1. Presumably, the hospital where the transplantation takes
place and the medical team involved in transplanting the organ into the recipient would charge
the insurance company directly rather than tack their charges onto the organ. See id. In the
context of a postmortem anatomical gift, these exceptions allow the hospital where the
individual died, morgues, medical transportation companies, and tissue banks processing the
cadaver to attach their costs to the cadaver and collect from the research institution or biotech
company purchasing a cadaver or parts thereof. See CHENEY, supra note 12, at 7–8.
43. See Laurel R. Siegel, Comment, Re-Engineering the Laws of Organ Transplantation,
49 EMORY L.J. 917, 927 (2000).
44. See, e.g., Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 481 (6th Cir. 1991); Spiegel v.
Evergreen Cemetery Co., 186 A. 585, 586 (N.J. 1936); Everman v. Davis, 561 N.E.2d 547,
550 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
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American courts recognized the right of the individual to specify
through a testamentary instrument the manner and method of
disposal of her dead body.45 However, most courts enforced these
rights only indirectly through claims for infliction of emotional
distress brought by the family.46 Thus, while courts sought to respect
and protect the wishes of the deceased, they avoided labeling the
body as property.
Yet, as technology has made possible more viable uses for body
parts and cadavers, courts have struggled to define the division of
rights between individuals, family members, and the government.
The Sixth Circuit has recognized, for example, that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a widow’s interest in
her deceased husband’s corneas,47 but the Georgia Supreme Court
has also held that the state legislature could override this interest.48
Additionally, the federal court for the District of Kansas held that
conversion was an inappropriate cause of action for parents seeking
redress when their son’s organs were not returned after an autopsy.49
The court reasoned that because damages could not be proved,
“partial remains of a human body[] ha[ve] no compensable value.”50
These decisions tend to be controversial because the refusal to frame
these issues in terms of property often leaves distressed family
members without an adequate remedy—or a remedy available only
through more difficult to prove theories of liability—in the face of
tragic actions of others.51

45. Siegel, supra note 43, at 928.
46. See Michelle Bourianoff Bray, Note, Personalizing Personalty: Toward a Property
Right in Human Bodies, 69 TEX. L. REV. 209, 230–31 (1990).
47. Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 482 (holding that Ohio law had created a property interest
which could not be removed without a hearing).
48. Georgia Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127, 128–29 (Ga. 1985)
(holding that the state’s presumed consent statute permitted the removal of a boy’s corneas
without the express consent of the boy’s parents).
49. Shults v. United States, 995 F. Supp. 1270, 1271–72, 1275–76 (D. Kan. 1998).
50. Id. at 1276.
51. See, e.g., Culpepper v. Pearl St. Bldg., Inc., 877 P.2d 877 (Colo. 1994). In this case,
the body of a young man was wrongly cremated. Id. at 878–79. The court held that there was
no cause of action for conversion; rather, the family had to sue for infliction of emotional
distress. Id. at 882. The court then granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss because the
family could not prove that the defendant’s conduct was outrageous, nor could they show
intent to cause emotional distress. Id. at 883.
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The most famous example in this area is Moore v. Regents of the
University of California.52 In Moore, a doctor treating a patient
suffering from hairy-cell leukemia removed the patient’s spleen and
several other tissues as part of the treatment.53 The physician sold the
tissues to a researcher who subsequently used them to develop a
patented cell line worth billions of dollars.54 The patient received
nothing in compensation, and even paid for his own treatment and
travel over seven years.55 In deciding the case, the court dismissed
the plaintiff’s conversion claim, holding that there is no ownership in
an individual’s removed tissues.56 While the patient prevailed on his
breach of fiduciary duty claim,57 the damages awarded could not
approximate the potential royalties from the patent. Thus, the
court’s decision recognized the physician’s (quasi) property rights in
the tissues since the sale from the physician to the researcher was
unquestioned, but refused to recognize any property rights for the
individual from whom the cell line originated. This bifurcated view
of property rights granted a windfall to the defendants while severely
undercompensating the patient.58
In addition to the common law, statutes specifically regulating
organ transfers have resulted in similar unintended consequences.
Blood Shield Statutes59 and other state health and safety legislation
categorically treat the transfer of organs from one individual to
another as a service rather than a transaction for goods or products.60
In other words, even though a tangible, physical item (the organ) is
traded between doctors, hospitals, and medical companies, and is

52. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
53. Id. at 480–81.
54. See id. at 482; see also Michele Goodwin, Expressive Minimalism and Fuzzy Signals:
The Judiciary and the Role of Law, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 19, 32 (2009).
55. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 481. The patient was induced—arguably fraudulently—
throughout this time to make several trips from Seattle to the UCLA medical center.
Goodwin, supra note 54, at 32 (citing Moore, 793 P.2d at 481).
56. Moore, 793 P.2d at 489.
57. Id. at 485.
58. See Goodwin, supra note 54, at 33.
59. Blood Shield Statutes, as the name implies, were enacted to shield health institutions
providing blood transfusions from strict product liability claims. However, these statutes have
been interpreted not only to apply to blood transfusions, but to human tissue transplants as
well. See, e.g., Condos v. Musculoskeletal Transplant Found., 208 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1229–30
(D. Utah 2002).
60. See, e.g., Condos, 208 F. Supp. 2d at 1230; Cryolife, Inc. v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 396, 405 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
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treated as a good for the purposes of those transactions, when the end
recipient enters the equation, the organ is deemed a service.61 The
end result of this classification is to preclude products liability claims,
essentially exculpating tissue banks whose negligence may result in
contaminated products.62 Because the tissue is not a good, tissue
recipients are not protected by the standard product warranties that
might otherwise deter tissue banks from negligently supplying
infected tissue.63 Further, because the tissue is a service, an injured
party’s primary recourse is through medical malpractice suits against
the doctors and hospitals involved in the transplant.64 Thus, the law
shifts the burden of ensuring that tissue is safe for implantation from
tissue banks and other suppliers, who are in the best position to test
for disease and ensure proper handling of tissues, to doctors and
hospitals, who have much less control over the quality of tissues they
receive.65
Such negligent treatment of tissue transplants can result in tragic
consequences.66 Bryan Lykins stands as a poignant example. Bryan
received a cadaveric tendon as part of a knee surgery.67 Although the
surgery was common, and in many ways routine, the tendon Bryan
received was from a cadaver that had been unrefrigerated for
nineteen hours.68 The bacteria that had been allowed to grow during
that time resulted in Bryan’s death only four days after the surgery.69
Even worse is the fact that Bryan’s story is not a singular or isolated
incident.70 Yet, even though tissue banks may negligently place
contaminated tissue on the market, they cannot be held liable if their
products result in illness or even death.71 Further, insofar as
lawmakers have been slow to act,72 tissue banks have little incentive

61. See Goodwin, supra note 54, at 41.
62. See id. at 42.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 43.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 41–42.
67. Id. at 41.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 42.
70. See M.A.J. McKenna, Tissue Transplant Firm Linked to 14 Infections, ATLANTA J.
CONST., Mar. 15, 2002, at A1.
71. Goodwin, supra note 54, at 41.
72. See Robert Pear, F.D.A. Delays Regulation of Tissue Transplants, N.Y. TIMES, May
14, 2003, at A18.
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to change their behavior, and some have been continually careless in
the products and “services” they are providing.73
Finally, adding a constitutional wrinkle to the already
complicated common law and statutory schemes, some scholars have
suggested that the disposition of one’s own body after death
implicates a fundamental privacy right and that actions of the
government should require a compelling justification with laws
narrowly tailored to achieving their intended purposes.74 These
scholars argue that the right to determine what one does with his or
her own organs falls along the same continuum of rights articulated
in the Supreme Court’s modern right of privacy doctrine.75 Under
this current doctrine, decisions “involving the most intimate and
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment,”76 and an individual should “be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person.”77 Further, where individual health
or bodily integrity is involved, “courts have held that personal
decisions are the sole prerogative of the person whose body will be
affected,”78 and even when those decisions carry potentially fatal
consequences, courts have still deferred to the individual.79 Thus,
since an individual’s decision regarding the disposition of his or her
organs is intimate, personal, and tied to bodily integrity, so the
argument goes, it implicates a fundamental right and any
government involvement in that decision must be supported by a
compelling government interest and laws must be narrowly tailored
to that end.
Alternatively, some have argued that organ donation restrictions
interfere with personal economic liberties in such a way that triggers

73. See McKenna, supra note 70.
74. Karen L. Johnson, Note, The Sale of Human Organs: Implicating a Privacy Right,
21 VAL. U. L. REV. 741, 761–62 (1987).
75. See id. at 751–55.
76. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
77. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
78. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp. Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 633 (Mass. 1986);
Johnson, supra note 74, at 753.
79. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663–64 (N.J. 1976). But see Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (rejecting the argument that the fundamental right to refuse
treatment encompasses a right to assisted suicide).
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intermediate scrutiny.80 While most economic legislation is granted
the presumption of constitutionality, in Plyler v. Doe81 the Supreme
Court eliminated that presumption and required a showing of an
important government interest with laws substantially fit to meet
that interest where economic legislation infringes on personal rights
not strong enough to be considered constitutionally fundamental,
but still valued by society in a greater or different way than other
liberties.82 Accordingly, in the context of organ sales, the right to
determine the disposition of one’s own corpse might not rise to the
level of a fundamental right under the constitution; nonetheless, it is
still valued by society at a higher degree than other liberties so as to
prohibit arbitrary governmental restrictions.83 Therefore, some argue
that any law restricting the sale of organs should be subject to
intermediate scrutiny, requiring the law to substantially relate to an
important government interest.84
While no court has held that organ sales are a constitutionally
protected interest, there is some jurisprudence supporting the
heightened scrutiny theory. In cases challenging statutes authorizing
the removal of corneas without the consent of the next of kin, courts
have justified these statutes by characterizing the state’s interest as
compelling.85 These cases seem to indicate that because some
enhanced right is implicated, courts are inclined to take a harder look
at laws overriding an individual’s choice regarding what to do with
her own organs.
III. PROPOSED MARKET MECHANISMS
Proposals of compensation models for donors of organs are many
and varied. Each of these various proposals has advantages and
drawbacks that cannot be discussed at length here. There are,
80. See Johnson, supra note 74, at 755–57.
81. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
82. See id. at 221. In Plyler, the Court analyzed a Texas statute restricting public
education from the children of illegal immigrants. Id. at 205–06. Although it explicitly stated
that public education was not a fundamental right, the Court applied a stricter scrutiny to the
law, ultimately striking down the restrictions because the personal interest in, and society’s
valuation of, public education was simply too great for rational basis review. See id. at 221.
83. Johnson, supra note 74, at 755–57.
84. Id.
85. See State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1190 (Fla. 1986) (providing sight to blind
citizens); Georgia Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127, 129 (Ga. 1985)
(maintaining public health).
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however, general categories under which various proposals fall. This
section seeks to provide a general overview of the overarching
categories as a backdrop for discussion. Specifically, this section
briefly discusses open markets (with various levels of government
regulation), futures contracts, and government tax or fee rebates.
First, the most prevalent suggestion—and the most
controversial—is to permit an open market for organ sales. Under
this model, individuals would contract with each other for the
transfer of an organ. While the prospect of purchasing an organ off
of eBay86 seems unsettling, such a scenario is not likely. Because of
the need for biological matching and the necessary involvement of
hospitals, the open market proposal would still be subject to a great
deal of government regulation. Proposed regulations have ranged
from government-imposed price discrimination or subsidies based on
income levels,87 to mandating that donors complete educational
courses on the risks of donation,88 to requiring donors to purchase
“donor insurance” to mitigate any unforeseeable health
complications that may arise in the future.89 All of these regulations
aim to forestall any bad consequences of a too-hasty decision.90
Second, the futures contracts proposal advocates a system in
which a donor contracts with an entity, such as an organ
procurement company, tissue bank, or research institution, for the
rights to his or her corpse upon death.91 At death, the deceased body
would be appraised and a named beneficiary would receive
compensation for the donor’s corpse.92 Alternatively, donors could
receive the payment of premiums, or a reduction in health insurance
premiums for opting into an annual futures contract.93 Estimates
86. In 1999, a kidney appeared on ebay.com for auction. Amy Harmon, Auction for a
Kidney Pops up on eBay’s Site, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1999, at A13. The starting bid was
$25,000, and reached $5,750,100 before eBay terminated the auction. Id.
87. See, e.g., Gregory S. Crespi, Overcoming the Legal Obstacles to the Creation of a
Futures Market in Bodily Organs, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 52 (1994).
88. Calandrillo, supra note 11, at 102–03.
89. Id. at 104–05.
90. See infra Part IV.
91. Calandrillo, supra note 11, at 108.
92. Lloyd Cohen, Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs: The Virtues of a Futures
Market, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 2 (1989). The appraisal would be required since the
manner and time of death would affect its total value.
93. Hansmann, supra note 23, at 61–71. Premium reductions would be calculated by
multiplying the risk of the individual’s death by the probability that their organs would be
harvestable and the value of those organs. Id. at 66–67. Each individual would opt in annually,
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show that these proposals could significantly reduce organ shortages,
even though all increases in the organ market would be cadaveric.94
Additionally, by avoiding living sales, concerns that the poor will be
exploited are alleviated while still increasing the supply of organs.95
Third, some scholars have proposed—and in fact some states
have tried96—to increase organ donations through government
rebates.97 The most common proposals are tax breaks, discounted
driver’s license fees, and reimbursed burial expenses.98 This approach
assumes that most people support organ donation, but do not
donate themselves because donation requires some positive effort on
their part; it is simply easier not to. Thus, by providing small
incentives, like a reduced driver’s license renewal fee that must be
paid anyway, people will find donation more efficient than inaction.
IV. SOCIETAL INTERESTS IN THE PROHIBITION OF ORGAN SALES
The arguments that the societal benefits of prohibiting organ
sales outweigh the benefits of individual choice are centered in
ethical and moral objections to the sale of human organs. These
objections are somewhat hard to articulate, and often are based on
an emotional reaction that cannot be expressed in altogether logical
terms. Describing this side of the debate in these terms may be a
mischaracterization, but the emotional nature of these objections has
been grounds for some criticism,99 and the arguments for prohibiting
organ sales are often simply summarized and dismissed in academic
literature.100

essentially granting the other contracting party the rights to harvest organs if death should
occur that year. Id. at 63.
94. Currently, most transplants are cadaveric, and many transplants, such as hearts and
lungs, are only cadaveric. Id. at 60. Annually, 20,000 Americans die in ways that would make
their organs harvestable. Id. Only 15% of those deaths are of people who agreed previously to
be organ donors. Id. Thus, the potential of futures contracts is an increase greater than 650%
in cadaveric donations.
95. Calandrillo, supra note 11, at 108.
96. Robert Steinbuch, Kidneys, Cash, and Kashrut: A Legal, Economic, and Religious
Analysis of Selling Kidneys, 25 HOUS. L. REV. 1529, 1557 (2009).
97. See Calandrillo, supra note 11, at 108–18.
98. See id. at 111–17.
99. See J. Radcliffe-Richards et al., The Case for Allowing Kidney Sales, 351 LANCET
1950, 1951 (1998) (arguing that opposition to organ sales derives from “deep feelings of
repugnance,” which “cannot justify removing the only hope of the destitute and dying”).
100. See, e.g., Calandrillo, supra note 11, at 91–93.
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However, even if one characterizes these arguments as emotional
and hasty, they still raise reason for serious pause. After all, every
country in the world, with the exception of two,101 has laws that
prohibit the sale of human organs.102 Further, while definitive
statements are somewhat difficult to find, it seems that most major
world religions oppose the sale of organs.103 Thus, the prohibition of
the sale of organs enjoys almost unanimous support across various
cultures, legal systems, and ethical frameworks.
This section attempts to articulate the driving forces behind these
arguments. In doing so, it addresses arguments directed at the rights
of individuals rather than the various objections to specific, proposed
methods of organ sales. Ultimately, this section focuses on three
arguments: 1) the sale of organs would have a disparate impact upon
the poor; 2) the commoditization of the body has a dehumanizing
effect on an individual’s perception of others; and 3) anything other
than an altruistic gift of the body would eliminate the idea that life
has infinite value.
First, perhaps the most prevalent argument is that if organ sales
were allowed, those choosing to sell organs would be predominantly
poor, and those receiving organs would be predominantly wealthy.104
This bifurcation raises concerns of distributive justice since the poor
would disproportionately supply organs, but because of a lack of
resources, they would be excluded from purchasing them.105 In
addition to allocation concerns, laissez-faire systems tend to benefit
sophisticated actors in the market at the expense of weaker, less
sophisticated parties who hold much less bargaining power. Hence,
the impoverished, driven by their financial plight to sell their
kidneys, might be coerced or intimidated into suboptimal deals by
profiteering organ brokers.106 Such transactions across society would
101. Iran and Pakistan. Id. at 86.
102. Id. Enforcement of these laws varies greatly from country to country. Id. at 87. Still
the fact that, at least nominally, almost all nations oppose organ sales is something to consider.
103. See Steinbuch, supra note 96, at 1566–68. Mr. Steinbuch cites statements from the
U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Catholic theologians Benedict Ashley and Kevin
O’Rourke, Bishop Dimitrios of Xanthos of the Greek Orthodox Church, the Board of Social
Responsibility at the Church of Scotland, Bishop Tom Breidenthal (Episcopalian), and a
committee of scholars from all the major Muslim Schools of Law in Great Britain. Id.
However, Mr. Steinbuch ultimately concludes that Jewish law may permit the sale of human
organs, relying on statements from Yisrael Meir Lau, former Chief Rabbi of Israel. Id. at 1577.
104. Calandrillo, supra note 11, at 93.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 89–90.
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only widen the gap between the rich and the poor in terms of health,
power, and wealth. Thus, assuming that one role of government is to
protect these weaker actors from entering into disadvantageous
transactions resulting from their lack of information, experience, or
bargaining power, the prohibition of organ sales is justified as a
means to protect the rights of the underprivileged.
Additionally, the health consequences from selling body parts for
desperately needed money may justify government restraint on
individual liberty as well.107 Desperation might drive a potential
donor to focus too much on the benefit and fail to seek enough
information about the risks, resulting in hasty decisions that do not
account for potential future health costs.108 These potential future
costs include not only the physical and mental health complications
for the donor, but costs for recipients as well, should donors seek to
conceal disease or health conditions from procurement companies in
order to bargain for higher prices for their organs.109 Thus, the
benefits gained from an increased supply of organs would be
diminished by the future health costs resulting from uninformed
decisions.110
These distributive justice concerns are, in many respects,
supported by the available data. A 2001 study of black-market
kidney sales in India showed that 96% of “donors” underwent the
process to relieve debt.111 However, the same study showed that
among these individuals, the number below the official poverty level
actually increased.112 After the surgery, average family income fell by
one third, and 86% of donors reported a decline in health.113
Additionally, the lack of bargaining power of these individuals is
exemplified by the fact that many of the donors were paid
significantly less than promised.114 Further, the decision to sell an
organ can also entail severe psychological consequences, including
107. See Madhav Goyal et al., Economic and Health Consequences of Selling a Kidney in
India, 288 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1589, 1592 (2002).
108. Calandrillo, supra note 11, at 94.
109. See id. at 94–95.
110. See id. at 94–96.
111. Goyal et al., supra note 107, at 1591 tbl. 2.
112. Id. at 1591. Individuals in the study averaged six years between the selling of a
kidney and participating in the survey. Id. at 1589.
113. Id. at 1591.
114. Id. This is a significant detriment when considering that donors in India now accept
less than $2,000 for a kidney. See Steinbuch, supra note 96, at 1561.
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anger, hostility, anxiety, and depression,115 conditions that were not
even measured by the study. While the results of a legitimate market
may not be as drastic, this study shows that concerns of distributive
justice are certainly warranted.
Second, opponents of legalizing organ sales believe that the
commoditization of the body is an affront to human dignity and
degrades the meaning of “human.”116 Indeed, this was one of
Congress’s main motivations in passing NOTA.117 ThenCongressman Al Gore—the main proponent of the bill—stated that
the sale of human organs would “blur[] the distinction between
people and things, as human organs become simply another
commodity to be bought and sold in the marketplace.”118 The fear
underlying this argument is that if price tags were attached to body
parts, individuals would begin to view others as having a quantifiable
value.119 Consequently, the value of humanity would simply become
the sum of all of its parts.
The feared result of such perceptions is that interactions between
individuals would deteriorate and civility would be lost. Throughout
history, society has witnessed many atrocities when humans were
treated as a tradable commodity, 120 or even when the value of an
individual was viewed through too utilitarian a lens.121 As such,
115. See Lyndsay S. Baines & Rahul M. Jindal, Letters: Consequences of Selling a Kidney in
India, 289 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 697, 697 (2003). Studies have shown anxiety, depression, and
feelings of guilt in recipients of organs. See L.S. Baines, D.N. Hamilton, and R.M. Jindal,
Compliance with Hemodialysis and Kidney Transplantation: A Psychotherapeutic Perspective, 33
TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 1895, 1895 (2001). It is reasonable to conclude that organ
donations—even absent dire circumstances—could result in similar symptoms. See id.
116. See LEON R. KASS, LIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE DEFENSE OF DIGNITY: THE
CHALLENGE FOR BIOETHICS 177–85 (2002); Melissa M. Perry, Comment, Fragmented Bodies,
Legal Privilege, and Commodification in Science and Medicine, 51 ME. L. REV. 169, 174, 183–
96 (1999).
117. See Gail L. Daubert, Note, Politics, Policies, and Problems with Organ
Transplantation: Government Regulation Needed to Ration Organs Equitably, 50 ADMIN. L.
REV. 459, 466 (1998).
118. Id. at 466 n.43 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Procurement and
Allocation of Human Organs for Transplantation: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Investigations and Oversight of the Committee on Science & Technology, 98th Cong. 307–18,
248 (1983), reprinted in 2 NATIONAL ORGAN TRANSPLANT ACT OF 1984, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF PUB. L. NO. 98-507 (1990)).
119. See id.
120. See Johnson, supra note 74, at 750–51 (discussing testimony before Congress before
the passage of NOTA comparing organ sales to slavery).
121. See, e.g., Leo Alexander, Medical Science Under Dictatorship, 241 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 39, 39–41 (1949) (describing the euthanasia programs of the Nazis when people were
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society’s interest in maintaining humane interactions between people
justifies any prohibitions on systems that treat the body or any part
of it as a tradable commodity.
Third, and perhaps the most difficult to articulate, opponents of
organ sales argue that the body is a gift, therefore not owned, and an
individual is not permitted to do as she pleases with it.122 This is the
common position for most religions that view the body as owned by
God, with the individual having limited stewardship over its use.123
This argument also shares common ground with the
commoditization argument because it suggests that while organ
donations promote good will, the introduction of monetary
incentives would corrupt proper social interactions between
individuals.124 Essentially, the gift of an organ is a gift of life and is,
therefore, infinite in value. The receipt of monetary compensation
for this gift, in effect, reduces the value of life by reducing the gift of
life to a quantifiable amount. Only an altruistic act can preserve the
infinite value of life, given originally to the donor and transferred to
the recipient.
V. THE CASE FOR MARKETS
These societal concerns rest on the assumption that restricting a
donor from receiving compensation for her organs in turn restricts
all market transactions for those organs. In fact, the opposite is true;

no longer useful to society).
122. See Erika Blacksher, On Ova Commerce, 30 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 29, 29–30
(2000), reprinted in MARSHA GARRISON & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE LAW OF BIOETHICS:
INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY AND SOCIAL REGULATION 678 (2d ed. 2009) (“My eggs . . . did not
seem mine, in the sense of ownership . . . . Somehow these eggs were mine, yet not. Not
unlike a gift. Gifts are given to us, by friends and family, and become ours. But we are not
permitted to do just anything with them.”).
123. Richard V. Grazi & Joel B. Wolowelsky, Jewish Medical Ethics: Monetary
Compensation for Donating Kidneys, 6 ISR. MED. ASS’N J. 185, 185 (2004) (“If the tissue or
organ to be donated is the gift of G[o]d and if the imperative of the Gospel is to love our
neighbor unconditionally, then donation must be made freely on the grounds of need, not
conditionally on the grounds of creed, or lucratively on the grounds of greed.” (quoting
Extract of the Report of Board of Social Responsibility of the Church of Scotland, CHURCH OF
SCOTLAND (1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
124. See Grazi & Wolowelsky, supra note 123, at 185 (“[I]f society is to live in a humane
manner, generosity and charity, rather than monetary gain and greed, must serve as the basis
for donation of functioning organs.” (quoting ASHLEY BM & O’ROURKE KD, HEALTH CARE
ETHICS: A CATHOLIC THEOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 411 (4th ed. 1997)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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the market for human organs is both booming and lucrative.125 As
such, the societal concerns justifying prohibition are undermined by
the fact that society feels few qualms about the flourishing organ
market under the current legal scheme.126 This section analyzes these
societal concerns in the context of the industry created by current
law and shows that they are not nearly as compelling when viewed in
isolation. Further, this section argues that while some prohibitions
are warranted, the ban on organ sales inequitably distributes wealth
and autonomy between donors and third parties involved in
transplantation.
A. The Industry
The market for human parts is a billion-dollar industry.127 While
most people think of this market as transacting only in kidneys,
hearts, and livers for the purpose of transplantation, modern
advances in medicine have provided many more uses for the human
body. Cadaveric skin is used to treat burn victims; bone is used in
oncology, as well as orthopedic and dental surgery, to treat bone loss
resulting from tumors; skin tissue is used to repair vocal chords
damaged by radiation treatment; tendons, cartilage, and ligaments
are used to repair joints in treating sports injuries; and cadaveric
heart valves are used to replace faulty valves in living hearts.128 In
fact, over one million of these and similar transplants are performed
annually in the United States.129 Furthermore, human tissues are
used in research to train medical students and to develop new
treatments for injuries and surgical techniques.130 In all, these new
technologies, treatments, and techniques have increased the value of
a human cadaver to over $250,000.131 This value is only increasing as
technology finds more and better uses for human tissues.

125. Schapiro, supra note 9, at G1.
126. See Calandrillo, supra note 11, at 97.
127. Schapiro, supra note 9, at G1. This estimate focuses specifically on tissue transplant
and does not even include whole-organ transplants. See id.
128. Id.
129. Goodwin, supra note 54, at 49.
130. See
Brokering
Body
Parts,
USATODAY.COM,
http://www.usatoday.com/money/graphics/body_parts/flash.htm (last visited Jan. 18,
2012).
131. Goodwin, supra note 54, at 50.
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Moreover, this dollar estimation is not hypothetical but is based
on how much end consumers are paying for human parts.132 In order
to facilitate organ donations and transplants, both NOTA and
UAGA allow parties involved in the “removal, transportation,
implantation, processing, preservation, quality control, and storage
of a human organ” to collect “reasonable payments” for the services
they provide.133 So, while the donor gives an organ free of charge,
the doctor who removes the organ, the hospital where the operating
room is located, the medical transportation company who transports
the organ, and the tissue bank that processes and tests the organ for
disease each attach charges to the organ. These charges are
ultimately paid by the recipient’s insurance company (in the case of a
transplant) or a research institution (in the case of a tissue purchase).
Therefore, while federal and state laws prevent the initial sale of an
organ, the end user of an organ must still purchase it.
While this may seem ironic, it is important to remember that this
feature of the law is essential to the organ transplantation system.
Society cannot encourage and increase the number of organ
donations if it requires doctors, hospitals, and medical companies to
donate their time and resources alongside the individual donating an
organ. Indeed, many companies whose income is solely generated by
providing organ transplantation services could not operate without
someone footing the bill. Further, the most logical person to bear
the cost of these services is the recipient, who is receiving the benefit.
Requiring either the donor or doctors and hospitals to bear the costs
of these services would halt all operations in the transplantation
system.
That being said, as rational actors in a market seek to maximize
profits, transplantation service providers increase their prices to
capture the maximum amount purchasers are willing to pay.134 In
other words, if a surgeon usually charges $4,000 for the removal of
an organ, and the hospital charges $4,000 for the operating room,
staff, and equipment, but an organ recipient is willing to pay
$50,000 to receive an organ, the charges that the surgeon and
hospital attach to that organ are quickly increased to $25,000
132. See Schapiro, supra note 9, at G1.
133. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2) (2006); see also RUAGA § 16(b) (2006).
134. Calandrillo, supra note 11, at 99–100; see also Emanuel Thorne & Gilah Langer,
The Body’s Value Has Gone Up: Who Should Profit from Organs?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1986, at
A23; Young, supra note 1.
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each.135 Consequently, because of the volume of transplantations
performed annually and the extremely high willingness to pay for
many organs,136 the industry has become incredibly profitable.
B. Commoditization Has Already Happened
The societal interests supporting the prohibition of organ sales
also assume that quantifying the value of the human body is bad.137
However, the current system, to which no ethical qualms are raised,
in fact quantifies the value of the human body.138 As such, an analysis
of the consequences of quantification does not have to be simply
hypothetical, but can be based on current observation. In the
context of this current commoditization, the ethical objections to
the sale are simply not as grave as when viewed in isolation.
On an empirical level, there is no disputing that the human
corpse now has a substantial economic value.139 And while the law
has prohibited at least the initial sale of organs, it has not prohibited
the purchase of an organ.140 Simply put, to say that the law prohibits
attaching a price tag to a donated organ is to ignore reality.141
The high demand and willingness to pay for organs, coupled
with the short supply, has created a lucrative business for organbrokering middlemen, who flip essentially costless, donated organs
for large profits.142 In fact, the prices at which organs are traded are
135. See Calandrillo, supra note 11, at 99–100. These numbers are completely
hypothetical for purpose of illustration.
136. See Steinbuch, supra note 96, at 1562. The price of a kidney has reached $90,000.
Id. This figure is “all-inclusive,” meaning it entails the travel costs of both the recipient and the
donor, in addition to all medical charges. Id. Presumably, a more efficient market structure
could reduce this price. See id.
137. See supra Part IV.
138. See Calandrillo, supra note 11, at 97.
139. See supra Part V.A.
140. See supra Part V.A.
141. See CHENEY, supra note 12, at xv. Cheney details a price list of various body parts
used for research purposes. The list includes:
Head $550–$900, Head w/o brain $500–$900, Brain $500–$600, Shoulder $375–
$650 (each), Torso $1,200–$3,000, Forearm $350–$850 (each), Elbow $350–
$850 (each), Wrist $350–$850 (each), Hand $350–$850 (each), Leg $700–$1000
(each), Knee $450–$650 (each), Foot $200–$400 (each), Whole Cadaver $4,000–
$5,000, Eviscerated torso $1,100–$1,290, Cervical spine $835–$1,825, Torso to
toe $3,650–$4,050, Pelvis to toe $2,100–$2,900, Temporal bones $370–$550,
Misc. organs $280–$500 (each).
Id.
142. See id. at 7–10, 125–60.
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so high that they have enticed many to undertake more creative
methods of procurement.143
Further, organs are often subject to a string of transactions in
which they are appraised and exchanged for money. Organs are first
donated by individuals, then sold by hospitals to tissue banks, then
sold by tissue banks to biotech companies, then processed and
refurbished before being sold to hospitals and dentists, and finally
implanted into the “end-consumer.”144 At each of these transfers—
with the exception of the very first—money is exchanged for the
organ.145 Perhaps more importantly, current jurisprudence
recognizes a legal interest in the organ of each of these players in
each transaction—again with the exception of the first—and has
validated sales contracts for human tissue.146 Thus, both markets and
the law itself treat organs as a commodity in all but one of the series
of transactions from donor to recipient.
Empirical evidence aside, the more fundamental cause of
commoditization of organs lies in the distinction between goods and
services. Services are valuable only through performance. Therefore,
by prohibiting performance, laws can remove all value since no one is
willing to pay for nonperformance.147 Contrarily, goods have
inherent value that exists prior to any transaction because the good
itself is useful. Laws can stop a sale, and therefore the realization of
the value, but the value still exists. Thus, laws regulating goods can
only serve as wealth distribution mechanisms, determining who has
access to the value of a good and who is restricted from it.148
Therefore, in the context of a transaction for an organ, while services
such as removal, transportation, processing, and implanting may
facilitate the transaction, the organ itself is the useful item and has
inherent value. However, because the law treats organs as a

143. See Michele Goodwin, Empires of the Flesh: Tissue and Organ Taboos, 60 ALA. L.
REV. 1219, 1219–21 (2009); Michele Goodwin, Commerce in Cadavers Is an Open Secret,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2004, at B15; see generally, CHENEY, supra note 12.
144. See Goodwin, supra note 54, at 49.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 32–33.
147. This, of course, assumes 100% enforcement.
148. One useful way to conceptualize this is the contrast between the prohibition on
prostitution, where the law prohibits the thing itself, and the prohibition on the use,
possession, or distribution of illegal drugs. The law cannot eliminate the utility of a good, and
therefore, to remove value it must prohibit instead an individual’s access to the utility.
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service,149 the law assumes that by proscribing the initial sale of an
organ it can remove all of the organ’s value. Also, it does not restrict
access to that value from any of the actors in the transaction—with
the exception of the donor. The end result is that the value of the
organ, unassigned by the law, is commoditized as other actors in the
market divide that value among themselves.150
Analyzing societal concerns in this context shows that the
current commoditization of the human body has not led to
degradation of the term “human.” Rather, both the increase in the
number of transplantations performed,151 and the social acceptance
of organ transplantation,152 seem to indicate that individuals are able
to distinguish between a person, individual, or soul and the parts,
organs, and tissues that comprise the physical body. The fear that the
value of human life would be reduced to the sum of the value of the
body’s parts has, in large part, not proven true, even in the face of
extreme increases in the monetary value of human parts. Worldwide,
society remains disgusted and shocked with the small subset of
people who do, in fact, view humanity in such base terms.153
Likewise, the interest of preserving altruism also breaks down in
light of the current system’s commoditization. Currently, transplants
are still seen as gifts of life, even though recipients pay large amounts
to receive them. One explanation for this could be that this “gift of

149. See supra Part II.
150. As mentioned previously, the price for a kidney has reached $90,000. Steinbuch,
supra note 96, at 1562. Further, research institutions pay large sums of money for fresh and
frozen cadavers or parts thereof. CHENEY, supra note 12, at xv. For an interactive display based
on
the
same
information,
see
Body
Parts
Pipeline,
USA
TODAY,
http://www.usatoday.com/money/graphics/body_parts/flash.htm (last visited Jan. 18,
2012). Also, one website has set up a cadaver calculator whereby, after answering a series of
questions regarding lifestyle, one can find out how much her body would be worth in the
event of her death. The Cadaver Calculator: How Much Is Your Body Worth?, CADAVER
CALCULATOR, http://www.oneplusyou.com/bb/cadaver (last visited Jan. 18, 2012).
151. Organ donation rates have generally increased in America across the last decade.
SCIENTIFIC REGISTRY OF TRANSPLANT RECIPIENTS, 2010 SRTR & OPTN ANNUAL DATA
REPORT, available at http://www.srtr.org/annual_reports/2010/flash/01_intro/index.html.
152. Sidney E. Cleveland, Personality Characteristics, Body Image and Social Attitudes of
Organ Transplant Donors Versus Nondonors, 37 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 313, 318 (1975)
(“[T]issue donation offers prospective donors a convenient and socially acceptable source for
expression of humanitarian needs.”).
153. See Paul Lewis, Kosovo Physicians Accused of Illegal Organs Removal Racket: Medicus
Clinic Linked in Council of Europe Report to Alleged Kosovo Liberation Army Organ Harvesting
Atrocities,
GUARDIAN
(Dec.
14,
2010,
10:17
AM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/dec/14/illegal-organ-removals-charges-kosovo.
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life” is of infinite value, so even if one has to pay several thousand
dollars, the surplus is still infinite. Under this assumption, allowing
organ donors to collect part of the price paid for an organ would still
award an infinite surplus to organ recipients, and thus still be
altruistic.154 Indeed, even where a donor receives compensation for
the organ, both the donor and the recipient can have positive
psychological experiences.155
It should also be noted that allowing the sale of organs would
not preclude someone from donating without compensation.156
Currently, the sale of blood and ova is allowed under law, but many
of the donations of these tissues take place without compensation.157
In fact, giving the donor the right to sell could actually increase the
value of an uncompensated donation by providing donors with more
power to ensure the recipient receives the surplus value of the organ
through contractually stipulated prices to prevent any inflation by
middlemen.
What is left, then, of the societal interests in prohibiting organ
sales is the concern about distributive justice. However, this
argument begins to cut both ways when taking into account that,
under the current system, the poor are cut off from the value of their
organs while wealthy doctors and hospitals are able to claim that
value.158 Further, despite the intentions of Congress and current law,
the allocation of organs for transplantation is still highly dependent
on the ability to pay.159 Thus, the current system still discriminates
between the rich and the poor.
Of course, there still remains the concern that the ability to sell
organs would entice the financially desperate into making poor
decisions. While government intrusion into these decisions is
certainly paternalistic,160 data on black markets indicates that such an

154. Recipients of life-saving medical procedures and treatments, such as open heart
surgery or chemotherapy, are also given “gifts of life.” Their gratitude is not diminished by the
fact that they have to pay for those services, nor do they quantify the value of life proportionate
to the price of their operation. See Calandrillo, supra note 11, at 98.
155. See Steinbuch, supra note 96, at 1579–80 (discussing how transplant surgeons often
feel gratified after saving someone’s life, even though they receive compensation).
156. Id. at 1579.
157. Id. at 1579–80.
158. See Calandrillo, supra note 11, at 99–100.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 100.
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intrusion may be warranted.161 In fact, it is within the context of the
desperate sale of organs by the poor that the fears about
commoditization have actually been realized.162 Middlemen take
advantage of the poor and their desperate situation to negotiate
cheaper prices and gain larger profits, while the poor donors often
end up worse off.163 This is at least something that the current
system prevents.164
These remaining concerns, however, would be alleviated by
prohibiting inter vivos sales while still allowing sales through futures
contracts. While there may still be a disproportionate number of
poor than rich willing to sell the rights to their cadaveric organs, the
secondary effects of postoperative health and psychological
consequences simply do not exist in the postmortem context.
Consequently, the risks of unsophisticated actors making decisions
that they might regret later—or given more information would not
make—are greatly reduced if not eliminated. In fact, negotiating
rights upon the death of an individual actually gives more bargaining
power to the individual since the necessary delay between
negotiation and execution of the contract does not permit hasty
decisions. Further, the poor would also have access to the value of
their organs and would not simply forfeit that value to doctors and
hospitals upon donation. The futures contracts system alleviates both
disparate impact concerns by allowing equal access to the value of
organs while eliminating the consequences of poor decision making.
C. The Right to Sell
Yet, the decrease in societal interests supporting the prohibition
of organ sales does not, by itself, provide positive justification for
allowing sales. The literature proposing legalization of organ sales
typically justifies its position by arguing the resulting benefit to
others; opening sales could potentially solve the organ shortage crisis
and provide longer lives for potentially 110,000 Americans,165 while

161. See supra Part IV.
162. See Eamonn O’Neill, The Cost of Living, SCOTSMAN, Mar. 10, 2001, at 14, available
at http://tinyurl.com/7hqz4e2 (detailing horrific incidences of the murders of the homeless
in Argentina and South Africa for their organs).
163. Calandrillo, supra note 11, at 102.
164. Although, ironically, it still is eerily similar to the current system under which
middlemen still reap all the profits.
165. See OPTN: Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, HEALTH RESOURCES
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eliminating the atrocities happening on the black market by
implementing a legitimate and—more importantly—regulated
market.166 The argument presented by this Comment, however, is
that organ sales should be allowed in order to achieve a more
equitable distribution of wealth and individual autonomy. The
current law merely transfers value and autonomy from well-meaning
donors to third parties in the transplantation process. By recognizing
donors’ interests in their own organs and giving them power to
control who may receive value from their organs, as well as where
and how their organs may be used, a more equitable system can be
achieved.
The refusal of the law to recognize any interests of donors in
their own tissues not only restricts donors from realizing the value of
their organs, but also strips them of the power to determine who
should receive that value.167 Organ donations can be construed not
as a gift to the recipient, but as a monetary donation to doctors,
hospital, and medical companies.168 Because the market treats organs
as goods, the naiveté of the law in treating them as a service assumes
that by prohibiting sales under a service-for-money model, it can
remove the legitimate value of organ and tissue donation. However,
restriction of a monetary transaction at the “point of sale” does not
AND SERVICES ADMIN., http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2011).
However, there is no way of definitively knowing how such a change would impact the
national organ shortage, especially when some data indicate that it may make the problem
worse. See Calandrillo, supra note 11, at 92 n.118. In a 1993 study, 80% of respondents said
that they would not be more likely to donate if money were offered, and 5% said that they
would be less likely. Id. Also, organ sales may, in many cases, treat the symptom but not the
disease. GARRISON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 122, at 757–58. Garrison and Schneider note
that the increase in demand for kidney transplants is correlated with the increase in rates of
diabetes, which, in turn, is highly correlated with increasing rates of obesity. Id. Thus, the best
approach for society to end the organ shortage may be to focus on prevention and cure of
diseases that cause organ failure in the first place rather than to open markets for swapping
organs. See id.
166. See e.g., Calandrillo, supra note 11, at 86–91. Indeed, each of the arguments
opposing sale of human organs is playing out with horrific consequences in the black market.
These consequences are only exacerbated by the fact that anyone participating in these markets
has no recourse or protections available through courts or legislatures. See id. Of course,
arguments to permit something on the grounds that it is happening anyway are not new and
would apply equally to issues such as prostitution and drug use as well. Such arguments ignore
that laws shape society’s concept of what is right or wrong and merely preach to the choir;
those who do not feel an act is immoral are persuaded by the fact that it is already happening
anyway, and those who do feel it is immoral are wholly unpersuaded.
167. See supra Part II.
168. See supra Part V.A.
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eliminate the value of a good, but merely displaces it. By ignoring
the inherent and pre-existing value of organs, the law has created an
ownership vacuum for these goods; the goods are transferred, and
the law makes it unclear how to distribute the value of those goods.
In this situation, the donor has no contractual power to designate
who should receive the value, and third parties are able to siphon off
value from the good, eventually capturing the entirety, even though
no one can argue that they have a property interest in the good.169
Thus, under the current system, donors can neither receive value nor
appoint the value to the recipient; rather, the suspended value is
captured in the profits of middlemen.170
Arguably, one solution to this problem is government regulation
of the prices that middlemen are allowed to charge. While in theory
this would eliminate the ability of middlemen to capture the value of
the organ as a good, it is practically flawed in two respects. First, if
something has value and goes through a series of transactions, each
of which is allowed to take some of that value, inevitably—no matter
what the law is—the system will be structured in a way to extract all
the value. In one sense, this is a cynical view of the world, but in
another, it is an efficient market at work. The law is a very blunt
instrument, and people are very good at constructing nuanced
systems that sidestep it. Second, the law is costly, and private selfordering would be much more efficient. Giving donors the power of
sale would put them in the dominant contracting position and
enable them to police the system both up front through contract
provisions and on the back end through litigation, should bad
behavior arise.
Further, granting the power of sale and subsequently the power
of contract to the donor allows donors to designate not only who
should receive the value of their organs, but also for what purposes
their organs are to be used. Currently, under most states’ laws, a
donor cannot direct, in full measure, how and where his organs will
be used.171 Rather, this discretion is given to doctors and hospitals
who sell the organs to various tissue banks and research
institutions.172 Consequently, the individual most interested in where
169. See Young, supra note 1.
170. See supra Part V.A.
171. See Schapiro, supra note 9. This does not refer to many living donations in which a
person may specify the recipient of a donated organ. See id.
172. See id.
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his organs go or how they are treated is made powerless in those
decisions. Many donors today are surprised that “life-saving”
donations are often used for penile enhancements or other cosmetic
purposes.173 Determining how a donated organ will be used is
essential to the autonomy of the individual. Allowing the
postmortem sale of organs would subsequently allow donors to
utilize contractual covenants to ensure their organs are used in a
manner they see most fit.
Despite the fact that allowing the sale of organs would vest the
value and right of disposition in the donor himself, such a change
could have practical consequences that need to be considered. It
could be argued that allowing donors to collect compensation for
their donation would increase the costs to recipients by adding yet
another price tag. While this would be true in a cost-driven market,
it does not hold true where middlemen are inflating costs to capture
excess willingness to pay.174 The price for organs is set by the
demand, which would remain constant.175 Allowing donors to
receive compensation along with doctors, hospitals, and biotech
companies would only shift the surplus currently collected by these
middlemen.
Additionally, it could be argued that the elimination of the
bright-line rule and moving from disallowing all sales to allowing
some while prohibiting others would require more regulation and
higher costs. However, more regulation is arguably needed in the
current system.176 Moreover, allowing one more transaction in a
system already comprising several transactions would have little,
ultimate impact. Perhaps most compelling, however, is that by
allowing organ sales, donors would have the contractual power to
determine where and how their organs are used. Utilizing market
forces to police the industry would reduce government costs and
provide a more efficient system.

173.
174.
175.
down.
176.
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VI. CONCLUSION

The law has struggled to define rights to one’s own body in the
face of increasing value created by new medical technologies. The
lack of appreciation for the new value of the body in the current
law’s prohibition of organ sales has created a system whereby
control, rights, and value are severed from the donor and recipient
and transferred to third parties. While there may be substantial
reasons to continue to prohibit the inter vivos sale of human organs,
the broader prohibition on all sales—including futures contracts—is
not supported by these reasons. While many have suggested drastic
changes to the legal structure surrounding the human body, existing
laws need only to be amended to restrict their prohibitions to inter
vivos sales. Such changes would not require the finding of a new
controversial fundamental right with a potentially expansive holding
and unforeseen consequences, nor would it require an enormity of
legislative action to invent a new statutory framework. These limited
changes would, however, recognize that individuals do have legal
interests in their own tissues, giving them recourse should the tissues
be misused. Most importantly, these limited changes would vest the
power to designate who receives value and where and how organs
should be used in the individual with the most at stake in these
transactions. Such changes would lead to more efficient and just
results in this increasingly important market.
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